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“No Sales Below Cost”
By Warren W. Nissley
Now that the national recovery administration and the act 
which created it have passed into history there is an inclination to 
regard the whole adventure as a closed incident—merely a costly 
experiment which failed. Since, however, there are already re­
ports of attempts to revive it, we would do well to see if there are 
not lessons to be remembered and experiences of which we well 
may take advantage if this method of economic control is again 
brought forward.
One of the underlying theories of that portion of the “new 
deal” which embraced N. R. A. was that all would be well if 
everyone deserving of employment were employed and, in addi­
tion, were paid a fair wage. Inasmuch as the conditions with 
which we were faced were very different from this ideal—and 
few intelligent persons would deny that it would be ideal—it is 
not surprising that the code makers were attracted by the theory. 
But they made a common mistake in attempting to use the end 
desired as the means of arriving at that end. As a result, trade 
and industry were given, as the law of the land, codes which put 
definite limitations on the minimum wages to be paid to employees 
and the hours they could work, and, in many cases, the hours 
during which machinery could be operated were also limited.
While business leaders endorsed the primary economic object 
of the codes, which was to have industry voluntarily agree to 
employ more people and thus alleviate unemployment, and to 
pay more aggregate wages for the same work, thus increasing the 
purchasing power of the masses and promoting recovery from 
the depression, it was quite natural that they should ask, to use 
a slang expression, “What will we use for money?” From the 
financial and accounting viewpoint, it is obvious that an employer 
can only pay wages out of the sales price of his goods or out of the 
working-capital portion of his capital funds. As a practical 
matter, at any given time, he can pay them only out of the cash 
he has in hand. It is obvious, for example, that a great corpora­
tion can not use any portion of its huge capital investments in 
plant and equipment nor even its inventories and accounts 
receivable to pay wages.
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The working capital of many employers had been depleted 
almost to the vanishing point by the depression years. Cash 
operating losses, including wages, had been met by paying out cash 
realized from the partial liquidation of other working-capital 
assets. This liquidation was possible because smaller quantities 
of goods could be carried in stock and at a lower cost per unit; 
and open accounts with customers were also less because of the 
reduced volume of business. It was only this partial liquidation 
that enabled many concerns to avoid the necessity of going into 
bankruptcy during the first few of the depression years. The 
recovery, which has already begun, will again involve larger 
working capital investments in inventories and receivables 
which must be paid for from cash on hand or new borrowings. 
Consequently, even if those employers who still had cash resources 
had been altruistic enough to consent to dissipate them more 
rapidly on a voluntary basis, it would have appeared most 
imprudent from the business standpoint to have asked them to 
increase cash losses to pay higher wages. Such a policy could 
only end in going out of business at a faster rate, and then there 
would be no employment. The only cash from which the wages 
of the country can safely be paid in a period of rising prices and 
increasing activity is that represented by the proceeds of the 
current sale of goods.
The code makers then adopted a second theory to the effect 
that, if all units in an industry were required to sell their goods for 
cost or more, the problem of providing money to pay wages 
would have been met. Here again, the end desired was used as 
the means, and many codes were adopted which prohibited 
“sales below cost.” Business leaders then asked, quite naturally, 
how goods could be sold at such an arbitrary price if it was so 
high that the consumers would not pay it, or if some other pro­
ducer could sell at less under the code, because his cost was less. 
The latter part of this problem also involved a definition of “cost,” 
since very few codes specifically defined the term which, by law, 
was the bottom below which selling prices could not drop. Many 
employers were already selling goods at less than cost under the 
old wage scales because no markets were available at higher 
prices and the adoption of codes did not provide any additional 
markets. Some attempts were made, without much success, 
to have codes approved which would, in effect, have guaranteed 
a profit by law.
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While many of the codes which were approved that contained 
some form of prohibition of sales below cost also contained a 
requirement for the development of a uniform method of cost 
finding to enable the units in the respective industries to determine 
their costs on a uniform basis, many of them did not. When an 
attempt was made to define cost, the language used for these 
provisions, and the meaning thereof, differed widely in the various 
codes. The theory most favored by N. R. A. appeared to be 
that no unit in an industry should be permitted to sell below its 
own individual cost, unless necessary to meet the competition of 
another unit which was selling below the first unit’s cost but not 
below its own cost. To meet such competition, the minimum 
price permitted to the higher cost producer was that quoted by 
the other. But since, in most cases, cost was not defined, this 
theory could not be enforced in practice and the effect was, of 
necessity, largely psychological.
Now let us consider what these provisions meant.
To the casual reader, a legal prohibition against sales below 
cost appears simple and innocuous enough—in fact, many would 
think that anyone who needed a law to prevent his selling below 
cost should have his brain examined. But this theory is not 
nearly as simple—nor perhaps as innocuous—as it seems.
It will help us to understand the necessity for some provision of 
this kind if we consider the chaotic condition of our price struc­
ture during the depression, and then examine its cause. The 
fundamental cause was our excess capacity to produce and to do 
practically everything, on the basis of the demand then existing, 
and in many cases, on the basis of any potential demand.
In passing, I might refer to the belief of many economists that 
there can never be real overcapacity while anyone lacks any­
thing he would like to have, and to their contention that the whole 
trouble with our economic system is in the distribution of the 
things produced. It seems to me that this is true only to a lim­
ited extent. It fails to take into account the fact that, in any 
form of society, those men whose toil has been rewarded with the 
things they want are apt to desire to reduce the amount of their 
toil rather than to continue working to supply the drones with 
the things the latter are too lazy to produce for themselves. This 
simply means that it is possible to have excess capacity and sup­
plies while there is still want, because those in want will not work. 
At the present time, there is also need for things we have the 
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capacity to produce because those needing these things can not 
find employment, and that is a defect of our distribution system.
The effect of this overcapacity on prices may be shown by re­
ferring to cost accounting. The expenses incurred in producing 
an article were originally classified by cost accountants in three 
groups: (1) the cost of the materials contained therein, known as 
direct materials, (2) the wages paid to the workmen who actually 
worked on the article directly or through a machine, known as 
direct labor, and (3) the other expenses of operating the plant, 
commonly known as overhead.
Under later developments of the art, cost accountants also 
made another classification of operating expenses to show: (1) the 
total cost of producing any article made and (2) the cost to the 
organization if it produced a certain article, which it would not 
have to meet if that article were not produced—i. e., the out-of- 
pocket cost.
The difference between the “total cost” and the “out-of-pocket 
cost” represents the so-called invariable overhead. This differ­
ence may be very important in large industrial units. When an 
organization is able to sell as much as it can produce, it is con­
cerned with the first, or total cost, of each article sold and natu­
rally bases its selling prices on that cost, since that is the only 
method of getting a profit. But when it is producing and selling 
at much less than capacity, sales based on “out-of-pocket” costs 
can assume a peculiar significance as a means of reducing losses. 
For example, consider a company which can produce 500,000 
units of an article in a year but, at a given time, is only producing 
at the rate of 100,000 units a year and has a total cost of doing 
business on that basis of $1,000,000 per annum. The total cost 
of producing each article is then $1,000,000 divided by 100,000, or 
$10 each. Now let us assume further that of the $1,000,000 total 
cost of doing business, $400,000 represented taxes, insurance, 
rent, depreciation, unavoidable maintenance, salaries of the essen­
tial non-operating personnel which can not be discharged without 
going out of business permanently, and similar expenses which 
would be just the same whether the plant operated or not, in 
other words, the unavoidable overhead. We see then that the 
remainder of $600,000 represents the expense the company had 
because it produced the 100,000 articles in excess of the expense 
it would have had if it had produced nothing. On that basis, 
the out-of-pocket cost of each article was $6.
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It seems quite logical for a particular management to feel that 
if it can sell these articles at $8 each, it is better than not operat­
ing, even though it realizes that if that policy is continued long 
enough, it will put the concern out of business, because of the 
losses incurred in paying out cash for the invariable overhead 
expenses. If each unit in the industry produced no more than its 
own share of the total production of the industry, and if the price 
of $8 which was obtained was uniform for all and was the highest 
possible price that could be obtained for that industry’s products 
under existing conditions, such a policy could be economically 
justifiable even though sales were made below total cost. But 
uses have been made of this spread between total cost and out-of- 
pocket costs that are not justifiable from the viewpoint of the 
industry as a whole.
During the depression many managements looked with longing 
eyes at their idle capacity, such as that in our example, which 
could produce 400,000 more units, and reasoned that if they 
could get some of the business that would normally go to another 
producer, by quoting a price of $7 for it, they would still be $1 per 
unit better off than if they did not get the additional business at 
all; and they would also be able to distribute the out-of-pocket 
labor cost to their own workmen. It was the policy of taking 
business on that basis, sometimes called predatory price cutting, 
that caused the final collapse of the price structure. In self­
defense, the unit that lost the business had to try to regain it or 
other similar business from someone else, by cutting prices still 
further, until finally the whole industry would be selling at or 
near the out-of-pocket cost of $6 per unit. In fact, those con­
cerns which did not have good cost systems frequently met the 
competition by going below $6 since they did not know what 
their out-of-pocket costs were. To attempt to protect their 
dwindling cash resources resulting from this policy, producers 
had no alternative but to reduce their expenses, including wages. 
But then the whole vicious circle started over again. It is not 
difficult to see how easy it was for purchasers to develop a buyer’s 
market under these conditions.
It must be admitted that good cost accounting systems and an 
accurate knowledge of costs on the part of some units at least in 
an industry actually accelerated this process, because it could be 
accurately shown that for a single unit, and for the moment, re­
sults were improved by taking business on that basis. But the 
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advantage gained could only be temporary. One can easily 
correct ignorant selling below out-of-pocket costs, because it is 
possible to show that is silly. It simply means there is less cash 
in the till after the transaction is completed than there was 
before. That can be corrected by adequate systems of cost finding 
and by education. Sales deliberately made at an out-of-pocket 
loss by a strong unit, which can afford to suffer the loss tempo­
rarily, to drive a weaker competitor out of business, are another 
matter. These are criminal activities and should be corrected by 
punishment through legal methods.
When we consider sales made at prices falling in the twilight 
zone between total costs and out-of-pocket costs, we are faced 
with important business and economic considerations that are 
not so readily answerable.
An expression frequently used in codes prohibited sales below 
the “cost of production.” I assume that “cost of production” 
thus used was intended to mean out-of-pocket costs as I have de­
fined them. A lower limit, such as that for an industry based on 
the costs of the lowest-cost producer, means exactly nothing in 
the way of protection for the industry. Other codes specified 
the items to be included in calculating costs, and when you had 
taken them all in, you had approximately “total cost.”
There is no doubt that a prohibition of sales below total cost 
would be an effective method of enabling all the present business 
units to stay in business and continue to be able to pay wages, if 
consumers had sufficient purchasing power to fill their require­
ments at prices calculated on that basis. In view of our present 
excess industrial capacity, it is probable that any minimum cost 
prescribed for an industry would be the cost at which the products 
of that industry would be sold. For if “total costs” are used as 
a minimum, even if they are the “total costs” of the “low cost” 
units or of the “efficient producers,” they will enable most of the 
high cost producers to stagger along hoping that more demand 
will develop and that “supply” will again become a factor in 
establishing the price structure on a basis that will enable low-cost 
producers to make a profit and high-cost producers to break 
even.
Under the “survival of the fittest” idea, the present situation 
as to excess capacity would be corrected by the bankruptcies of 
the financially weak and the inefficient units until supply and 
demand approached each other on the basis of conditions existing 
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at the moment of approach. In industries in which we are cer­
tain that the present excess capacity will be permanent, it would 
be most unwise to interfere with this process. But when it is 
reasonably certain that the excess capacity will again be needed 
in the near future, it appears sounder economically and requires 
less toil from man in the aggregate to try to save the units we now 
have rather than to destroy some of them and later on find it 
necessary to replace them. Moreover, destroying units and con­
centrating production in other units frequently is a great hardship 
to labor, which may find it necessary to move its residence to the 
areas containing the surviving units in order that employment 
may be found.
Another objection to the bankruptcy method is the length of 
time required to eliminate the weakest units when all are fairly 
strong, and the enervating effect on the survivors of the inter­
necine struggle. This factor is more important now than for­
merly because of the tremendous investments in plant and equip­
ment that are necessary for modern industrial operations. Cash 
expenditures for these assets have been made in the past and— 
thanks to the ease with which stock sold during the boom—have 
been largely paid. A prudent management knows that it 
must provide for the deterioration in and replacement of its 
equipment by providing a depreciation fund out of its sales prices. 
On the other hand, a management which is fighting for its exist­
ence knows that there is little salvage value in an abandoned 
plant, and rightly decides that it is better to sell without pro­
viding for depreciation than not to sell at all, since depreciation 
does not represent a current out-of-pocket cost. If the weaker 
units set selling prices on this basis, the stronger ones are greatly 
handicapped in maintaining their business and prices on a basis 
which will care for depreciation.
If this question were to be approached on a sound economic 
basis, it would be necessary for someone to decide which industries 
should be permitted to have price protection to maintain the 
status quo of the present units, because their full capacity will 
soon be needed, and which industries should be required to work 
out their destiny by jungle law. The important phrase in the 
preceding sentence is “it would be necessary for someone to 
decide” and the practical problem is to find the “someone” who 
could and would decide equitably in all cases. This “someone” 
who sits as the judge would need to have an accuracy of vision
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and a disinterestedness which it is difficult to associate with 
ordinary mortals.
However this question of over-capacity is finally settled, there 
is no doubt that those organizations which have adequate cost 
data will be in the most favorable position to find their proper 
place in their own industry. So far as I have been able to learn, 
there was not much real progress under N. R. A. in assisting busi­
ness units to determine their costs better than they did before, 
although there was much talk on the subject. And that is 
natural, for the development of this information must be expected 
to require a considerable period of time. I would estimate that if 
every possible effort were made, it would require from two to five 
years before really comparable cost data could be obtained in an 
important industry producing diversified products. The installa­
tion and maintenance of a cost system requires the outlay of a 
considerable amount of money, although executives generally 
realize that cost data are worth all they cost. But at a time when 
business was faced with the necessity of decreasing and not in­
creasing current expenses, it was natural that managements should 
want to know if N. R. A. was apt to be continued on some basis 
that would permit a use to be made of data that would justify the 
cost of getting it. Today I am inclined to believe that the anti­
trust laws will be so modified as to permit the intelligent coopera­
tive use of cost data, and if this should be so, there will be plenty of 
work for all the competent cost accountants in the country for 
many years to come.
A cost accounting system should never be developed until one 
has become familiar, in the full detail, with the manufacturing 
operations and the factory layouts in the organizations involved. 
In other words, it is not a swivel chair job and a man who can not 
feel at home in the midst of factory operations should never at­
tempt to design a detailed system of cost finding. One must get 
into the factory, talk to the foremen and to the workers, observe 
how their work is done and make each installation fit the par­
ticular factory in which it is to be used. That would not be 
necessary if the various units in an industry all made the same 
things in the same way, but unfortunately, that is not the case. 
There is a great overlapping of products, and there is also a very 
real difference in the detailed procedure of manufacturing the 
same product in different plants. I do not mean to say that the 
same principles of cost finding can not be applied throughout an 
industry, or that the final reports prepared can not be in the same
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form; but prescribing basic principles and the form of reports 
will not mean much in the way of really comparable data unless 
the basic principles are applied to a particular situation in such a 
manner as to reflect fully the manufacturing peculiarities of that 
organization.
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